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For three years after the typical developing country opens its stock market to inflows of foreign capital,
the average annual growth rate of the real wage in the manufacturing sector increases by a factor of
seven.  No such increase occurs in a control group of developing countries.  The temporary increase
in the growth rate of the real wage permanently drives up the level of average annual compensation
for each worker in the sample by 752 US dollars -- an increase equal to more than a quarter of their
annual pre-liberalization salary.  The increase in the growth rate of labor productivity in the aftermath
of liberalization exceeds the increase in the growth rate of the real wage so that the increase in workers'
incomes actually coincides with a rise in manufacturing sector profitability.
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In the late 1980s developing countries all over the world began easing restrictions on 
capital flows.  A decade later many of the same nations experienced a string of financial crises, 
triggering a debate over the relative merits of capital account liberalization as a policy choice for 
developing countries.  Critics claim that liberalization brings small benefits and large costs 
(Bhagwati, 1998; Rodrik, 1998; Stiglitz, 1999).
1  Recent surveys document evidence to the 
contrary.  Liberalization in developing countries reduces the cost of capital, temporarily 
increases investment, and permanently raises the level of GDP per capita (Henry, 2007; Obstfeld, 
2007; Stulz, 2005). 
In the process of debating the costs and benefits of capital account liberalization, both 
critics and apologists have neglected the labor market.  While it is important to understand how 
opening up affects prices and quantities of capital, almost two decades after the advent of capital 
account liberalization in the developing world, there is no systematic evidence on the behavior of 
wages in the aftermath of the policy change.  This paper provides the first attempt to fill that gap.  
Figure 1 shows that in a sample of eighteen developing countries that opened their stock 
markets to inflows of foreign capital between 1986 and 1993, the average annual growth rate of 
the real wage in manufacturing jumped from 1.3 percent per year in non-liberalization periods to 
an average of 8.6 percent in the year liberalization occurred and each of the subsequent two 
years.  The temporary 7.3 percentage-point increase in the growth rate of the real wage 
permanently drives up the level of average annual compensation for each worker in the sample 
of liberalizing countries by about 752 US dollars—an increase equal to more than a quarter of 
their annual pre-liberalization salary. 
One concern about Figure 1 is that an exogenous world-wide shock unrelated to opening 
                                                 
1 Fischer (2003), Obstfeld (1998), Rogoff (1999), and Summers (2000) review potential benefits of liberalization. 
1 may drive up real wages in liberalizing and non-liberalizing countries alike.  To distinguish the 
country-specific impact of liberalization policy from that of a common shock, our estimation 
procedure compares the difference in wage growth before and after liberalization to the same 
difference for a control group of countries not undergoing liberalization at the same time.  In 
every specification, we find an economically and statistically significant increase in real wage 
growth for countries in the liberalization group but no effect for the control group. 
Standard production theory provides the simplest explanation of the new facts that we 
document.  Liberalization reduces the cost of capital, and firms respond by increasing their rate 
of investment.  For a given growth rate of the labor force and total factor productivity, a higher 
rate of investment increases the ratio of capital per effective worker, driving up the marginal 
product of labor, and in turn, the market-clearing wage.  Consistent with this interpretation, 
Figure 2 demonstrates that the growth rate of labor productivity also rises sharply in the 
aftermath of liberalizations.  The average growth rate of labor productivity is 10.1 percentage 
points higher during the three-year liberalization window than in non-liberalization years.  
Again, the control group experiences no such increase. 
While our difference-in-difference approach enables us to test for effects of liberalization 
on real wages and productivity that have previously gone unexamined, difference-in-difference 
estimation requires caution because the standard errors are susceptible to serial correlation.  For 
instance, of the ninety-two difference-in-difference papers published in top economics journals 
between 1990 and 2000, only five explicitly address serial correlation (Bertrand, Duflo, and 
Mullainaithan, 2004).  Peterson (2006) makes a similar point about panel data studies published 
in the top three finance journals between 2001 and 2004.  The Bertrand et al. (2004) critique of 
difference-in-difference estimates applies with special force in the context of the liberalization 
2 experiment examined in this paper. 
Liberalizing the stock market increases investment, which in turn drives up productivity 
and wages.  Because it takes time for wages to adjust, wage growth for a given country may 
remain elevated above its steady-state rate for a number of years in the post-liberalization period, 
thereby inducing serial correlation in the country’s wage-growth residuals over time.  Similarly, 
liberalization often occurs at the same time across countries, thereby inducing correlation in the 
wage-growth residuals across countries at a given point in time.  Our empirical analysis uses 
clustering techniques to adjust the standard errors for the occurrence of both forms of 
dependence in the residuals (we also adjust for heteroscedasticity).  No matter what specification 
we use, or how we compute the standard errors, the impact of liberalization on real wage growth 
remains economically and statistically significant for the treatment group and insignificant for 
the control group. 
The potential endogeneity of the liberalization decision also raises some concerns.  If 
profit-maximizing firms in a financially closed economy face the prospect of rapidly rising labor 
costs they will want to substitute capital for labor in the process of production.  To the extent that 
liberalizing would reduce their cost of capital, these firms have an incentive to lobby the 
government to do so.  If rising wages cause governments to open up then our estimates will 
spuriously indicate a strong impact of liberalization on wages, when causation in fact runs the 
other way round.  While theoretically plausible, the endogeneity argument has no empirical 
support.  Figure 1 is not consistent with the view of liberalization as a response to rising labor 
costs.  If anything, wage growth actually falls slightly in the run-up to liberalization (Section 5A 
shows that mean reversion à la Ashenfelter (1978) does not drive our results).  The data are also 
not consistent with the explanation that governments liberalize in anticipation of higher future 
3 labor costs.  Although wages rise sharply in the aftermath of liberalization, labor productivity 
rises even faster, so that unit labor costs actually fall. 
Finally, with only eighteen countries in the sample, one may worry that a few large 
outliers drive the central finding.  This is not the case.  In the aftermath of liberalizations, a 
temporary increase in real wage growth occurs consistently across countries.  In all but three of 
eighteen countries, the median growth rate of real wages in the post-liberalization period exceeds 
the pre-liberalization median.  Finally, the documented effects persist after controlling for 
movements in the exchange rate and the impact of contemporaneous macroeconomic reforms 
such as inflation stabilization, trade liberalization, and privatization programs. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 uses theory to generate testable 
predictions about liberalization and explains how we identify real-life liberalization episodes.  
Section 3 discusses the wage data and construction of the control group.  Section 4 contains 
descriptive findings.  Section 5 presents the main empirical results and evaluates the consistency 
of the estimates with standard production theory.  Section 6 conducts robustness checks and 
considers alternative interpretations.  Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Capital Account Liberalization in Developing Countries 
This section generates empirically testable predictions about the impact of capital account 
liberalization in a developing country on the time-path of the real wage ( ).  To maintain 
congruency with previous work we employ the well-trodden framework of the neoclassical 
growth model, but apply it in a way that delivers previously untested theoretical predictions. 
w
The central point about capital account liberalization is that it moves developing 
countries from a steady state in which their ratios of capital to effective labor are lower (and rates 
4 of return to capital higher) than in the developed world, to a steady state in which capital-to-
effective labor ratios and rates of return equal those in the developed world.  Because capital and 
labor are complements in production, the marginal product of labor (and hence the real wage) 
rises as countries open up and the process of capital deepening sets in.  
 
2A. Theory 
Assume that the country produces output using capital, labor, and a constant-returns-to-
scale production function with labor-augmenting technological progress: 




k =  be the amount of capital per unit of effective labor and 
AL
Y
y =  the amount of 
output per unit of effective labor.  Using this notation and the homogeneity of the production 
function we have: 
( ) yf k =                                                                                        (2) 
Also assume that the country saves a constant fraction of national income each period and adds it 
to the capital stock, capital depreciates at the rateδ , the labor force grows at the rate n, and total 
factor productivity grows at the rate g. 
When the economy is in steady state,   is constant at the level  k . s state k , and the marginal 
product of capital equals the interest rate (r) plus the depreciation rate:  
. () ss t a t e fk rδ ′ = +                                                                            (3) 
Because the impact of liberalization works through the cost of capital, equation (3) has important 
implications for the dynamics of  and w in the aftermath of opening up.  k
Let r* denote the exogenously given world interest rate.  The standard assumption in the 
5 literature is that r* is less than r, because the rest of the world has more capital per unit of 
effective labor than the developing country.  It is also standard to assume that the developing 
country is small, so that nothing it does affects r*.  Under these assumptions, capital surges in to 
exploit the difference between r* and r when the developing country liberalizes. 
The absence of any frictions in the model means that the country’s ratio of capital to 
effective labor jumps immediately from  . s state k  to its post-liberalization, steady-state level 
(
*
. s state k ).  In the post-liberalization steady state, the marginal product of capital equals the world 
interest rate plus the rate of depreciation: 
( )
**
. s state fk r δ ′ = +                                                             (4). 
Instantaneous convergence is an unattractive feature of the model, because it implies that the 
country installs capital at the speed of light.  There are a variety of formal ways to slow down the 
speed of transition, none of which alters the fundamental predictions about wage growth in the 
aftermath of liberalization (Henry, 2007, Section 4.1).
2  The vital point is that  is greater than 0 
during the country’s transition to its post-liberalization steady-state, and the temporary growth in 
k has implications for the growth rate of the real wage. 
k  
The growth rate of the real wage is the derivative of the natural log of   with respect to 
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We may write this expression as 
                                                 
2 See also chapter 2 of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). 
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 is the elasticity of substitution. 
The right-hand-side of Equation (5) demonstrates that the growth rate of the real wage 





), is not affected by capital account policy in the canonical version of the neoclassical growth 
model (Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2006).  In Section 5B we discuss the implications of recent work 
that adopts a more catholic view of the relationship between capital account liberalization and 
total factor productivity.  For now, we proceed as though the impact of liberalization works 
strictly through the second term, which is the product of the inverse of the elasticity of 
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greater than 0 during the transition to 
*
. s state k , the growth rate of the real wage also increases 
temporarily.  Figure 3 illustrates the hypothetical time paths of r and the natural log of k and w 
under the assumption that the interest rate converges immediately upon liberalization but the 
ratio of capital to effective labor does not. 
The actual responses of the cost of capital, the quantity of capital and wages to 
liberalization resemble their hypothetical time paths.  We know from previous work that 
7 liberalization permanently reduces the cost of capital (Stulz, 2005) and temporarily drives up the 
growth rate of capital (Henry, 2003; Chari and Henry, 2008).  Figure 1 shows that the growth 
rate of the real wage also increases temporarily.  Later in the paper (Section 5B) we use Equation 
(5) to examine whether the magnitude of the estimated increase in the growth rate of the real 
wage is consistent with the magnitude of the previously documented increases in the growth rate 
of capital.  The next subsection explains how we identify the real-life liberalization episodes 
used to construct Figure 1. 
 
2B. Reality 
Testing the prediction that real wage growth will rise following the removal of 
restrictions on capital inflows requires information on capital account liberalization dates that is 
more precise than can generally be obtained.  In theory, opening the capital account is as simple 
as pulling a lever.  In reality, a country’s capital account has many components, so trying to 
determine exactly when it liberalizes the capital account (as in Section 2A) is perhaps the most 
difficult task in trying to assess the economic impact of changes in capital account policy. 
In fact, the difficulty of determining precise liberalization dates causes most papers in the 
literature to ignore the problem (Eichengreen, 2001).  Instead of asking whether opening the 
capital account has an impact on a country’s growth rate (as theory clearly dictates), most 
published studies examine whether openness and long-run growth are positively correlated 
across countries.  A brief description of the data typically employed in such studies illustrates 
why tests of opening and openness are not equivalent. 
To construct measures of openness, previously published work uses the broadest 
indicator of capital account policy available, the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
8 Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER).  The AREAER lists the rules and 
regulations governing resident and nonresident capital-account transactions in each country, a 
table summarizing the presence of restrictions, and a qualitative judgment on whether the 
country has an open or closed capital account.  For the editions of AREAER published between 
1967 and 1996, the summary table contains a single line (line E2) entitled, “Restrictions on 
payments for capital transactions.”  The presence of a bullet point in line E2 indicates that the 
country has some form of restrictions on capital account transactions.  In effect, line E2 delivers 
a binary judgment on whether the IMF considers a country’s capital account to be open or 
closed. 
The typical study maps the qualitative information from Line E2 into a quantitative 
measure of openness by tallying the number of years that each country was free from restrictions.  
Dividing that tally by the total number of years in the period produces a number called SHARE—
the fraction of years over a given period that the IMF judged the country as open.  For example, 
if a country was declared open for 15 of the 30 years from 1967 to 1996, then SHARE equals 0.5. 
Papers that use the variable SHARE assess the economic impact of capital account policy 
by running cross-country regressions of GDP growth on SHARE.  The problem with such 
regressions is that they implicitly test whether capital account policy has a permanent impact on 
growth while the theory predicts one that is temporary.  The distinction between temporary and 
permanent has consequences.  Cross-sectional regressions of growth on SHARE can generate 
spurious conclusions about the impact of liberalization on growth (Henry, 2007). 
The cross-sectional approach to measuring the impact of capital account policy on growth 
is equally inappropriate for estimating the impact of liberalization on the growth rate of wages.  
Because theory predicts a short-lived impact of liberalization on wages, it is not enough to know 
9 the fraction of years in which a country had an open capital account.  We need to know the exact 
year in which the country opened up.  In principle, one could look for the year in which the 
judgment in line E2 of the AREAER switches from “closed” to “open.”  The problem is that 
when the AREAER changes an assessment from closed to open, it provides no information on 
the specific component of the capital account that was liberalized.  Without such information the 
empirical implications of a change in openness are unclear. 
For example, AREAER does not indicate whether the change in judgment about 
openness results from an easing of restrictions on capital inflows or outflows.  The distinction 
matters.  Theory predicts that when a capital-poor country liberalizes capital inflows it will 
experience a permanent fall in its cost of capital and a temporary increase in the growth rate of 
wages.  In principle, if that same developing country were to liberalize capital outflows nothing 
would happen to its cost of capital, investment, or GDP.
3 
In contrast to the previous literature, this paper addresses the complexity of identifying 
liberalization dates by narrowing the scope of the problem.  Instead of trying to determine the 
date on which the entire capital account switches from closed to open, it identifies the first point 
in time that a country liberalizes a specific component of the capital account.  One example of 
liberalizing a specific component of the capital account is a decision by a country’s government 
to permit foreigners to purchase shares of companies listed on the domestic stock market.  
Liberalizing restrictions on the ownership of domestic shares enables foreign capital to flow into 
a part of the country’s economy from which it was previously prohibited.   
Just such a policy change occurred repeatedly in the late 1980s and early 1990s, as a 
number of developing countries opened their stock markets to foreign investors for the first time.  
                                                 
3 For discussions of why this may not occur in practice, see Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych (2008) and 
Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002). 
10 Removing restrictions on the ownership of domestic shares enables foreign capital to flow into a 
part of the country’s economy from which it was previously prohibited.  Relative to the broadest 
conception of the capital account, the easing of restrictions on foreign investment in the stock 
market may seem like a parochial way to define capital account liberalization.  But it is precisely 
the narrowness of stock market liberalizations that make them useful for testing the theory.  As 
the previous paragraphs explain, changes in broad measures of capital account openness such as 
the AREAER provide a very noisy measure of liberalization policy.  Since measurement error 
reduces the statistical power of any regression, it is important to focus on policy experiments 
where the true variation in the data is large relative to noise. 
As the closest empirical analogue to the textbook example in Section 2A, stock market 
liberalizations provide just such experiments (Frankel, 1994).  Accordingly, in this paper we use 
the year in which countries first opened their stock markets to foreign investors as the empirical 
counterpart to year “0” in the model of Section 2.  According to Standard and Poor’s Emerging 
Markets Database, there are 53 developing countries with stock markets.  Of these fifty three, 
eighteen have stock market liberalization dates that are: (a) consistently used elsewhere in the 
literature and (b) verifiable from primary sources.  Column (1) of Table 1 lists these eighteen 
countries and the year in which they liberalized.
4  Table 1 also presents summary statistics on the 
behavior of real wages in each of the eighteen liberalizing countries.  The next section explains 
the source and construction of the wage data. 
 
3. Data 
The wage data come from the Industrial Statistics Database of the United Nations 
                                                 
4 For further details about the complexities of determining stock market liberalization dates see Section 5 of Henry 
(2007) and the other references therein. 
11 Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO).  UNIDO provides data on total wages and 
salaries, total employment and output for the manufacturing sector.  For a given year, wages and 
salaries include all payments in cash or in kind paid to employees.  Payments include: (a) direct 
wages and salaries; (b) remuneration for time not worked; (c) bonuses and gratuities; (d) housing 
allowances and family allowances paid directly by the employer; and (e) payments in kind.  
Excluded from wages and salaries are employers’ contributions on behalf of their employees to 
social security, pension and insurance schemes, as well as the benefits received by employees 
under these schemes and severance and termination pay. 
Conceptually, total wages and salaries equal W*L*H, where W is the hourly wage rate, L 
is the stock of labor and H is total hours worked for the year.  Since UNIDO provides no data on 
the number of hours worked or the hourly wage we divide total wages and salaries by total 
employment (L) to compute the average annual wage (W*H) in the manufacturing sector of each 
country.  UNIDO reports the value of wages and salaries in US dollars, with the conversion from 
local currency made at the official nominal exchange rate.  We deflate each country’s nominal 
annual wage in US dollars by the US consumer price index (CPI ) to create a dollar-denominated 
real wage. 
In addition to information on wages, employment, and output, we would like to have data 
on the manufacturing capital stock.  Unfortunately, UNIDO only provides data on investment.  
The standard approach to an absence of capital stock data converts investment flows to capital 
stocks with the perpetual inventory method by making assumptions about the initial level of 
capital in some year and using the investment flows to interpolate the subsequent time path of the 
capital stock.
5   
Interpolation is methodologically sound when the focus is on long-run relationships 
                                                 
5 See, for example, Schoar (2002). 
12 where assumptions about the initial stock of capital make little difference.  In contrast, this paper 
focuses on short-run dynamics and therefore requires a clear picture of the trajectory of the 
capital stock during the liberalization window.  Simply put, it would be inappropriate for us to 
interpolate the growth rate of the capital stock during liberalization episodes when we are trying 
to measure the impact of liberalization on capital stock growth.  Moreover, the UNIDO data set 
is missing more than 50 percent of the country-year observations for investment in the aggregate 
manufacturing sector, and many of these missing observations fall within the liberalization 
window.  In the absence of reliable capital stock data, we will use (in Section 5B) estimates of 
capital stock growth from previously published work to check the consistency of our results with 
the theoretical channel from capital growth. 
For each country in our sample, the annual wage data generally run from 1960 to 2003, 
with the exact dates differing by countries. After taking the difference of the natural log to 
compute growth rates, we have a total of 502 country-year observations with which to identify 
the impact of liberalization on real wage growth.  Table 1 shows that the timing of liberalizations 
is correlated across countries, so these 502 observations are not entirely independent.  For 
instance, liberalizations may coincide with an exogenous global productivity shock that drives up 
wages in all countries, irrespective of whether or not they liberalize.  To address whether this is 
the case we select a control group of countries in the manner described below. 
 
3A. Construction of the Control Group 
An ideal control group would consist of developing countries that are identical to the 
liberalizing countries in every respect except that the control countries did not open their stock 
markets to foreign investment.  In practice, many of the developing countries that have stock 
13 markets but never liberalized them are not appropriate for the task at hand.  The purpose of the 
control group is to determine whether a global economic shock unrelated to opening up drives 
the temporary increase in real wage growth in the liberalizing countries.  It is therefore critical 
that the control group not consist of countries in such an abject state of development that real 
wages would not respond to an external shock, no matter how favorable. 
As it turns out, the list of forty-eight countries (see Appendix A) that have stock markets 
but never liberalized includes many countries at a low level of economic infrastructure such as 
Burkina Faso, Chad, Malawi, Sierra Leone, and Togo.  Also, for those countries on the list of 
forty-eight that are at a similar stage of development as the liberalizers, their demarcation as non-
liberalizers raises doubts about the reliability of the classification.  For instance, Jamaica is 
classified as having never liberalized, but in 1987 one of the authors of this paper purchased 
stock there (as a naturalized US citizen).   
In the absence of an ideal set of control countries, we use the liberalizing countries as 
their own control group in the following way.  For a given liberalizing country, we define the 
control group as the subset of the eighteen countries in Table 1 that did not liberalize during the 
window of time that begins two years before and ends two years after the given country’s 
liberalization date.  For example, Venezuela liberalized in 1990, so any country that did not 
liberalize between 1988 and 1992 appears in its control group.  This subset consists of Chile, 
India, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Nigeria, the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, and Zimbabwe.
6 
Restricting the control group to countries that did not liberalize between years [-2, -1, 0, 
1, 2] makes theoretical sense.  The lion’s share of the impact of liberalization on wages occurs in 
years [0, +1, +2] (Henry (2007), Section 4.1).  Therefore, the question is whether the real wage 
in liberalizing countries grows faster in years [0, +1, +2] than it does in countries that did not 
                                                 
6 The entire set of control countries for each liberalization year appears in Appendix A. 
14 liberalize during that time period.  Countries that liberalized in years [-2, -1] are also excluded 
from the control group because the end of their liberalization period overlaps with the beginning 
of the given treatment country’s liberalization period. 
To the extent that liberalization has a substantial impact on the real wage beyond year 
[+2], the methodology will bias our results against finding significant differences between the 
treatment and control group.  To illustrate the potential bias, consider Venezuela and four 
members of its control group: Chile, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand.  Venezuela liberalized in 
1990 while Chile, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand all liberalized in 1987.  This means that the 
third year after liberalization in those four countries is year [0] for Venezuela.  If the impact of 
liberalization on wages in the four control countries persists into the third year after opening up, 
the difference between wage growth in Venezuela and the control group in year [0] will be 
artificially compressed. 
Extending the control group restriction beyond two years would alleviate the problem of 
overlap, but for every given liberalizer, it would severely reduce the number of countries in the 
control group.  In the end, we prefer to risk understating the significance of our results to using 
control groups that are not adequately large.  
 
4. Descriptive Findings 
Figure 1 dispels the concern that an exogenous global shock drives the liberalizing 
countries’ increase in real wages.  The y-axis of Figure 1 measures the natural logarithm of the 
real wage.  The x-axis measures years relative to liberalization.  The solid line plots in 
liberalization time the mean of the natural log of the real wage for all countries that liberalized.  
The dashed line plots the mean for the control group.  Whereas the solid line exhibits a steep 
15 positive inflection after year [0], indicating a sharp increase in the growth rate of the real wage, 
the dashed line remains flat as a pancake.  While the flatness of the dashed line in Figure 1 
suggests that a common global shock does not explain the inflection in the solid line, with only 
eighteen countries in the sample an important question is whether a few outliers drive the 
increase.
7 
Turning from means to medians, the data in Table 1 demonstrate that this is not the case.  
In the first year after liberalization (year [1]) five countries experience real wage growth that 
falls below the median growth rate of their real wage for the entire sample period.  Under the 
null hypothesis that liberalization years are no different than non-liberalization years, the 
probability of finding no more than five countries below their median growth rate is 0.06.  
Similarly, in year [2], only five countries experience below-median annual real wage growth.  
Taking years [1] and [2] together, the probability of finding no more than ten episodes of below-
median wage growth is 0.03. 
Although the numbers in Table 1 suggest a consistent increase in real wage growth across 
countries, several other questions about the data remain. 
First, the necessity of using annual instead of hourly wages raises a potential 
measurement concern.  If the average number of annual hours worked per employee increases 
following liberalizations, then total annual compensation may rise without any change in the 
implied hourly wage.  In other words, the rise in annual labor income (W*H) documented in 
Figure 1 could be the result of an increase in hours worked rather than an increase in the hourly 
                                                 
7 We use the control groups to construct the dashed line in Figure 1 as follows.  Fix a country and its corresponding 
liberalization date.  For each element of the liberalizing country’s control group, calculate the natural logarithm of 
the real wage for the years in the interval [-2, -1, 0, 1, 2].  This yields a set of control-group-real-wage paths for the 
fixed liberalization-country.  Next, for each year in [-2, -1, 0, 1, 2] calculate the mean over the entire set of all 
control-group-real-wage paths.  Calculating these means creates a single path of the real-wage growth for the control 
group associated with the given liberalizing country.  After repeating this procedure for each of the other seventeen 
liberalizing countries, we have eighteen control-group-real-wage-growth paths, one for each liberalizing country.  
The dashed line in Figure 1 is the average of all eighteen of these paths. 
16 wage rate.  To interpret the impact of liberalization on total annual compensation as an increase 
in labor’s compensation per unit of time, we need to know that the average number of hours 
worked does not rise significantly following liberalizations.  Section 6 documents that we obtain 
similar results in a subsample of countries for which we have data (from a source other than 
UNIDO) on hourly wages. 
Second, UNIDO reports salaries and wages in US dollar terms.  In countries with high 
inflation, the rate of depreciation of the official nominal exchange rate may not keep pace with 
inflation.  Under such a scenario, the real exchange rate appreciates and the dollar value of wages 
becomes artificially inflated.  Similarly, liberalization itself may lead to a real appreciation, 
because opening the capital account generates a surge in capital inflows that strengthens the 
value of the local currency vis-à-vis the dollar.  If liberalizations coincide with bouts of increased 
real appreciation, then the temporary rise in the growth rate of the real wage illustrated in Figure 
1 may mechanically reflect changes in the bilateral real exchange rate rather than any 
fundamental impact of capital account liberalization on the labor market.  Figure 4 addresses the 
concern by replicating Figure 1 using wages measured in real local currency terms instead of real 
dollars.  Since Figure 4 is virtually identical to Figure 1, indicating that the choice of currency 
makes little difference, the rest of the paper focuses on the real wage measured in dollars. 
Third, liberalizations often coincide with major economic reforms that could have a 
significant impact on wages outside of any impact of liberalization.  Stabilizing inflation, 
removing trade restrictions, and privatizing state-owned enterprises are all reforms that may 
affect real wages through their impact on the efficiency of domestic production.  Indeed, Table 2 
demonstrates that the timing of these reforms makes it plausible that they, not capital account 
liberalization, are responsible for the increase in real wages apparent in Figure 1.  The next 
17 section uses the information in Table 2 to control directly for the impact of other reforms and to 
address a host of lingering concerns and alternative explanations. 
 
5. Empirical Methodology and Results 
We evaluate the statistical significance of the temporary increase in wage growth by 
estimating the following panel regression:  
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       (6) 
The left-hand-side variable,  , is the natural log of the real dollar value of annual 
compensation for country i in year t minus the same variable in year t-1.  Moving to the right-
hand-side of equation (6), the constant   measures average annual wage growth over the entire 
sample period after controlling for the country-fixed effects denoted by the variable  .   
ln it w Δ
0 a
i COUNTRY
The variable   is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one in the year 
that country i liberalizes (year [0]) and each of the subsequent two years (years [1] and [2]).  This 
means that the coefficient   measures the average annual deviation of the growth rate of the real 
wage from its long-run mean over the three-year liberalization episode.    is a 
dummy variable that takes on the value one for all members of country i's control group during 
country i's liberalization episode.  The coefficient   measures the extent to which an exogenous 





An alternative way of ensuring that the coefficient on the variable   reflects 
the impact of country-specific liberalization policy and not that of a common shock would be to 
drop the control group variable and add year-fixed effects.  We do this in Section 6, and the 
it LIBERALIZE
18 results are virtually identical to the benchmark estimates from Equation (6). 
Equation (6) constrains the coefficient on both the liberalization and control dummies to 
be the same across countries.  A different approach would use a seemingly unrelated regression 
(SUR) to generate a unique set of coefficient estimates for each country.  The problem with SUR 
is that it has low power.  SUR also requires a balanced panel, and due to missing observations, 
creating a balanced panel would result in discarding a number of liberalization events.  Given 
data limitations, the pooled cross-section time series framework is more appropriate. 
The right-hand-side of equation (6) contains three additional dummy variables—
STABILIZE, TRADE, and PRIVATIZE—that help to disentangle the impact of capital account 
liberalization from concurrent economic reforms.  We treat reforms and liberalization 
symmetrically, constructing dummy variables that take on the value one in the year a reform 
program begins and each of the two subsequent years. 
Turning at last to the error term,  it ε , it is important to note that the standard distributional 
assumptions needed for valid statistical inference will not hold in the presence of: (a) correlation 
of the residuals across countries within a given time period, or (b) correlation of the residuals 
within a given country over time.  Point (a) matters because liberalizations often occur at the 
same time for different countries, possibly inducing correlation in the wage-growth residuals 
across countries at a given point in time.  Point (b) matters because it takes time for wages to 
adjust to their new trajectory; for a given country, wage growth may remain elevated above its 
steady-state rate for a number of years in the post-liberalization period, thereby inducing serial 
correlation in the country’s wage-growth residuals.   
To compute standard errors that are correct, we construct clusters of residuals which 
allow for correlation within each cluster of observations.  First, we cluster by year to produce 
19 standard errors that account for the possibility that shocks to wage growth are correlated across 
countries within a given year.  Second, we cluster by country to produce standard errors that 
account for the possibility that the shocks to wage growth are correlated over time within a given 
country.  We also report estimates that correct for heteroscedasticity. 
 
5A. Results 
Table 3 (Panel A) shows that the impact of liberalization on real wage growth is 
economically large and statistically significant.  The estimate of the coefficient on the 
liberalization dummy ranges from 0.051 to 0.086.  This means that during liberalization episodes 
the average annual growth rate of the typical country’s real wage exceeds its long-run mean by 
an average of 5.1 to 8.6 percentage points per year.  Every estimate of the liberalization dummy 
in Panel A of Table 3 is statistically significant.    
An exogenous shock to wages does not seem to drive the result.  The estimate of the 
coefficient on CONTROL ranges from -0.011 to –0.02 and fails to attain statistical significance in 
every specification.  An F-test confirms that the difference between the estimate of the 
coefficient on LIBERALIZE and CONTROL is statistically significant at the one percent level in 
every specification in Table 3.  
Controlling for the other economic reforms that tend to accompany liberalization also 
does not reduce the impact of capital account opening on the growth rate of the real wage.  
Column (5) in Panel A of Table 3 shows that after accounting for the effects of inflation 
stabilization, trade liberalization, and privatization, the coefficient on LIBERALIZE is 0.073.  
Because some of the economic reforms have a significant impact on the growth rate of the real 
wage, we are confident in the accuracy of the reform dates and the relevance of the 
20 corresponding dummy variables as controls.  For instance, the coefficient on STABILIZE is -
0.088 and significant at the one percent level.  The negative impact of stabilization programs on 
real wage growth is consistent with the literature on the real effects of inflation stabilization in 
developing countries.
8 
Finally, the significance of the estimates of the liberalization dummy presented in Panel 
A of Table 3 is also robust to the statistical concerns raised on page 19.  Table 4 (Panel A) 
presents estimates that adjust the standard errors to account for heteroscedasticity.  Table 5 
(Panel A) presents estimates that adjust for heteroscedasticity and cross-country correlation.  
Table 6 (Panel A) presents estimates that correct for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.  
None of these adjustments to the standard errors alter the results from Panel A of Table 3 in a 
material way.  The liberalization dummy remains statistically significant in every specification of 
Panel A in Tables 4, 5 and 6.  Because the statistical significance of the estimates of the 
liberalization dummy are not sensitive to the method of computing standard errors, to economize 
on space, we turn our attention to the more central question of economic significance. 
There are two ways to examine the economic significance of the results.  First, consider 
the magnitude of the growth rate of the real wage during liberalization episodes relative to the 
growth rate of the real wage over the entire sample.  To do this, use the estimate of the constant 
and the liberalization dummy from the regression that controls for other economic reforms 
(Column (5) of Panel A in Table 3).  The estimate of the constant is 0.013, indicating that the 
real wage grows by an average of 1.3 percent per year over the entire sample.  The estimate of 
the coefficient on the liberalization dummy is 0.073.  Adding the constant and the coefficient on 
the liberalization dummy gives the average growth rate of the real wage during liberalization 
episodes—8.6 percent per year.  This means that in the year the liberalization occurs and each of 
                                                 
8 See, for example, Fischer, Sahay, and Vegh (2002). 
21 the subsequent two, the average growth rate of the real wage in the typical country is almost 
seven times as large as in non-liberalization years.   
Of course, the increase in the growth rate of the real wage is temporary, so a second way 
of assessing economic significance is to compute the impact of liberalization on the permanent 
level of the real wage.  For the countries in the treatment group, the average level of annual 
compensation in the year before liberalization (year [-1]) is 2951 US dollars.  During the three-
year liberalization window the real wage grows at 8.6 percent per year, so that by the end of year 
[2] the level of the real wage is 2951 = 3820 US dollars.  Now assume that that if the 
country had not liberalized the real wage would have grown by 1.3 percent per year.  In that 
case, the end of year 2 the level of the real wage would be 2951 = 3068 US dollars.  In other 
words, by the time the impact of liberalization has run its course, the average worker in the 
manufacturing sector has annual take home pay that is 752 dollars higher than it would have 
been in the absence of liberalization.  This change in the level is greater than a quarter of the 
level of the average manufacturing worker’s pre-liberalization take home pay. 
.086*3 e
.013*3 e
It is also important to note that the results do not simply reflect mean reversion following 
a temporary fall in earnings à la Ashenfelter (1978).  While Figure 1 does show a gradual decline 
in the level of the real wage from years [-5 ] to [-1], a few hypothetical calculations demonstrate 
that the results in Tables 3 through 6 do not simply reflect a bounce-back effect.  Five years prior 
to liberalization, the level of the real wage is 2,681 dollars.  Now, suppose that instead of 
declining for the next four years, real wages grew at their (continuously compounded) long-run 
rate (1.33 percent per year) for the next decade.  Under that scenario, the real wage in year [+5] 
would be 3,063 dollars.  The actual level of the real wage in year [+5] is 4,496 dollars, 38.4 
percent higher than the level that would have prevailed had wages continued to grow at their 
22 long-run rate.  Simply put, the increase in the level of the real wage is too large to be an artifact 
of reversion to the mean. 
 
5A.1 The Impact of Liberalization on Productivity 
The response of wages to capital account liberalization is large.  To scrutinize the 
plausibility of our estimates we cross-checked the results against data on labor productivity.  The 
model in Section 2 demonstrates that liberalization induces capital deepening, and through the 
increase in capital per worker, drives up productivity, the demand for labor, and the real wage.  If 
this chain of reasoning has any empirical bite then during liberalization episodes labor 
productivity should rise in concert with wages.   
To formally test the relation between liberalization and the growth rate of labor 
productivity, we estimate the following regression:  
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    (7). 
Equation (7) is identical to (6) except that instead of the change in the natural log of the annual 
wage, the left-hand-side variable is now the change in the natural log of value-added per worker. 
Panel B of Table 3 shows that liberalization has a positive and significant impact on 
productivity growth.  The estimates of the coefficient on the liberalization dummy range from 
0.056 to 0.101.  Every estimate of the coefficient on the liberalization dummy in Panel B of 
Table 3 is statistically significant.  In contrast, the estimate of the coefficient on the control 
dummy is never significant.  Taken together, these results suggest that liberalization, not an 
external shock or domestic economic reforms, is responsible for the increase in productivity 
growth. 
23 In particular, Column (5) of Panel B in Table 3 demonstrates that after accounting for the 
potential impact of other economic reforms, the estimate of the coefficient on the liberalization 
dummy is 0.101.  This means that the average growth rate of productivity is 10.1 percentage 
points higher during the three-year liberalization window than in non-liberalization years.  The 
10.1 percentage point increase in productivity growth associated with liberalization is larger than 
the 7.3 percentage point increase in wage growth.  Because the increase in productivity outstrips 
the increase in wage growth, manufacturing-sector profitability actually rises during 
liberalizations.
9   
 
5B. Discussion 
While the size of the increase in productivity growth more than matches the size of the 
increase in real wage growth, the important unanswered question is whether the magnitude of 
either increase is consistent with the neoclassical model.  To answer the question, begin with the 
standard assumption that liberalization has no impact on TFP growth and recall Equation (5):   
1( )
()
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With no change in the growth rate of TFP, the change in the growth rate of the real wage equals 
the product of three numbers: the reciprocal of the elasticity of substitution, capital’s share in 
national income, and the change in the growth rate of capital. 
The capital share lies between 1/3 and 1/2.  Obtaining an estimate of the change in capital 
growth requires a little more effort.  We know from previous work that aggregate capital stock 
growth increases by 1.1 percentage points following liberalizations (Henry, 2003).  We can use 
the aggregate number to calculate a rough upper bound for the change in manufacturing sector 
                                                 
9 Chari and Henry (2008) also find that the return to capital in the manufacturing sector rises during liberalizations. 
24 capital growth.  For the countries in our sample, the manufacturing sector accounts for 1/5 of 
GDP.  Assuming zero net growth in capital for the agriculture and service sectors, the largest 
possible increase in the growth rate of capital in manufacturing is about 5.5 percentage points.  
This back-of-the-envelope calculation finds empirical support elsewhere in the literature.  Using 
a subset of the countries in this paper, Chari and Henry (2008) calculate that the growth rate of 
capital in the manufacturing sector increases by 4.1 percentage points per year following 
liberalizations.  Increases in capital stock growth between 4.1 and 5.5 percentage points are also 
consistent with the size of the fall in the cost of capital that occurs following liberalizations.
10 
Suppose the capital share is 1/2 and the change in capital growth is 5.5 percentage points. 
Then for capital-deepening alone to explain the 7.3-percentage-point increase in wage growth 
you need an elasticity of substitution less than or equal to 3/8.  If the capital share is 1/3 and the 
change in capital growth is 4.1 percentage points, then the elasticity of substitution must be less 
than or equal to 1/5.  There is little consensus on the size of the elasticity of substitution.  Early 
work estimated small elasticities that were statistically indistinguishable from zero.
11  More 
recent studies cannot reject the hypothesis that the elasticity of substitution is 1 (Caballero, 
1994).  Most relevant to the countries in this paper, Coulibaly and Millar (2007) estimate an 
elasticity of substitution of about 0.8 for South Africa.  With a standard error of 0.08, the 
Coulibaly and Millar estimate could imply an elasticity as small as 0.64.  With a change in 
capital growth of 5.5 percentage points, a capital share of 1/2, and an elasticity of substitution of 
0.64, Equation (5) predicts that liberalization would generate a 4.3 percentage-point increase in 
wage growth. 
We do not mean to push any particular value for the capital share.  And it is far from 
                                                 
10 See Henry (2007), pp. 897-900. 
11 For a survey of this literature see Chirinko (1993). 
25 clear that we have a consensus estimate of the size of the elasticity of substitution in developed 
countries, let alone emerging economies.  What is clear, however, is that if you want to maintain 
the orthodox assumption that liberalization has no impact on total factor productivity, then the 
observed increases in wage growth are consistent with the model only if you are willing to 
concede that the elasticity of substitution is less than 1 (i.e., the world is not Cobb-Douglas).  But 
if the elasticity of substitution is significantly less than one, then it is hard to understand how 
profitability remains constant (or even increases slightly) following the liberalization-induced 
fall in the cost of capital. 
On the other hand, if you maintain that the world is Cobb-Douglas, then our wage results 
necessarily imply that liberalization has a large impact on TFP growth.  Indeed, if one is willing 
to step outside the confines of the Solow model there are plausible theoretical channels through 
which liberalization could raise total factor productivity.  For instance, liberalization may enable 
firms to import more efficient machines (e.g., tractors instead of hoes) that effectively shift the 
country’s production technology closer to the world frontier.  DeLong (2004) argues that after 
liberalizing the capital account “…developing countries…would enjoy the benefits from 
technology advances and from learning-by-doing using modern machinery.”  In other words, to 
the extent that technological progress diffuses from developed to developing countries, the 
importation of new machinery provides an important conduit through which the diffusion may 
occur.  Ninety-five percent of the world’s research and development (R&D) takes place in 
industrial countries (Helpman, 2004, p. 64), and these same countries account for over 70 percent 
of the world’s machine exports in a given year (Alfaro and Hammel, 2007).  
Evidence from the literature supports Delong’s conjecture that developing countries can 
import technological progress by liberalizing the capital account.  In the immediate aftermath of 
26 liberalizations, firms in the manufacturing sector of developing countries accumulate capital at a 
faster rate than they did before the liberalization (Chari and Henry, 2008).  Furthermore, these 
countries raise their rate of capital accumulation by importing more capital goods.  As a result of 
liberalization, the share of capital goods imports to total imports rises by 9 percent, and the share 
of total machine imports as a fraction of GDP rises by 13 percent (Alfaro and Hammel, 2007).   
The observation that both imports of capital goods and total factor productivity rise in 
concert with liberalization lends credence to the notion that new capital goods embody 
technological progress and that developing countries can raise their growth rates of total factor 
productivity by liberalizing the capital account.
12   The observation is also consistent with work 
showing that: (a) the cross-country correlation between investment and growth stems primarily 
from investment in equipment and machinery (DeLong and Summers, 1991, 1993) and (b) cross-
country variation in the composition of capital investment explains much of the cross-country 
variation in total factor productivity (Caselli and Wilson, 2003). 
Some argue that the simplest explanation of capital-account-liberalization-induced TFP 
growth lies with the economic reforms that accompany liberalization (Henry, 2003).  Economic 
reforms improve resource allocation, essentially producing a one-time shift in the production 
function that temporarily raises the growth rate of TFP, without inducing technological process 
per se.  Others posit that liberalization facilitates increased risk sharing, which might encourage 
investment in riskier, higher growth technologies (Levine, 1997; Levine and Zervos, 1998a). Yet 
another explanation is that capital account liberalization generates unspecified “collateral 
benefits” that increase productivity (Kose, Prasad, Rogoff, and Wei, 2006).  
Sorting through competing explanations for the increase in total factor productivity 
                                                 
12Also, in the spirit of Rajan and Zingales (1998), liberalization may improve domestic firms’ access to external 
finance, which might in turn increase the rate at which firms import capital goods. 
27 following liberalizations is an important research challenge that lies beyond the scope of this 
paper.  The bottom line of this discussion is that the size of the increases in wage growth and 
productivity we report are consistent with the model that drives our estimation.  Whether the 
primary source of those increases lies with capital deepening or increased total factor 
productivity depends on reasonable differences in views about the elasticity of substitution that 
have yet to be resolved in the literature. 
 
6. Robustness Checks/Alternative Explanations 
To examine whether the significance of our results depends critically on our construction 
of the control group we adopt a different tack.  We re-estimate the impact of liberalization by 
regressing wage growth on a constant, country-fixed effects, year-fixed effects, the liberalization 
dummy variable and dummy variables for the other reforms: 
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In Equation (8) the year-fixed effects now play the role that the control dummy variable played 
in Equation (6), preventing the impact of common global shocks to wage growth from inflating 
the coefficient on the liberalization dummy.  We replicated all of the specifications in Tables 3 
through 6 and obtained very similar results.  The coefficient on LIBERALIZE is economically 
and statistically significant in every specification, and the point estimates range from 0.058 to 
0.081.  The same results hold when we estimate Equation (8) with labor productivity on the left-
hand-side.  The coefficient on the liberalization dummy is always significant and ranges from 
0.057 to 0.102.  To save on space we do not include tables with all of these additional estimates 
but they are available upon request. 
 
28 6A. Alternative Explanations 
One interpretation of the evidence says that wages rise following liberalizations because 
of an increase in labor demand stemming from a capital-deepening induced rise in productivity.  
Alternatively, the increase in wages may be due to a reduction in labor supply.  The argument 
runs as follows.  If workers perceive the impact of liberalization on wages to be permanent, then 
they effectively receive a positive shock to their permanent income and may reduce their labor 
supply accordingly.
13  If this is the case then the observed increase in wage growth may stem 
from a decrease in labor supply as well as an increase in labor demand. 
The employment data are not consistent with a decrease in labor supply.  There is no 
discernible change in the growth rate of employment following liberalizations.  We regressed the 
change in the natural log of employment on the same right-hand-side variables that appear in 
Equation (6), and the liberalization dummy was never significant.     
We also looked at data on hours worked.  If labor supply decreases then the number of 
hours worked should fall.  In our attempt to see whether this is the case we had to rely on data for 
a smaller set of countries, because UNIDO does not provide data on hours worked.  The 
International Labor Organization (ILO) data was also not helpful, because the ILO’s definition of 
hours worked is inconsistent across countries and sometimes varies across sectors within a given 
country.  In the end we obtained consistently constructed data on hours worked from the 
Groningen Growth and Development Center (GGDC) for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Korea, Turkey, Taiwan, and Venezuela.  We regressed the change in the natural log of hours 
worked on the same right-hand-side variables that appear in Equation (6).  Again, the 
liberalization dummy was never significant. 
                                                 
13 An alternative view is that labor supply is relatively inelastic (see Pencavel 1986 on this point).  If this is the case, 
workers may not reduce the number of hours that they want to work in response to the increase in their expected 
future income. 
29 The absence of a significant change in the number of hours worked also suggests that the 
increase in the growth rate of the annual real wage reported in Section 5A is not driven by a 
greater number of hours worked, but an increase in the rate of compensation per unit of time.  As 
a final check we also used the GGDC data to construct a measure of hourly wages for the subset 
of countries mentioned above.  Regressing the change in the natural log of the hourly wage on 
the same right-hand-side variables that appear in Equation (6), we find results that are 
qualitatively identical to those reported in Panel A of Tables 3 through 6.   
Overall, the evidence does not suggest that workers reduce their labor supply in response 
to liberalization.  While we do not formally estimate the labor supply decision and cannot 
exclude the possibility that part of the wage increase results from a decrease in labor supply, if 
this alternative explanation is at work, its overall impact would appear to be second order. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Opening the stock market to foreign investment drives up real wages in the 
manufacturing sector of developing countries without eroding profitability.  Since workers gain, 
and owners of capital do not lose, the lingering question would seem to be: If liberalizing is such 
a good thing why do countries wait so long to do it?  In trying to answer this question one has to 
be a little cautious.   
The evidence in this paper applies only to manufacturing.  In the absence of data on 
wages in agriculture or services, we cannot conclude that capital account liberalization improves 
aggregate welfare.  Integration into the world economy during the 1980s and 1990s increased the 
ratio of skilled-to-unskilled wages in developing countries (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007).  The 
possibility remains that easing restrictions on capital inflows contributed to the widening of the 
30 gap.  Therefore, while it may not cause distributive conflict within manufacturing, liberalization 
may create winners and losers across other sectors, with attendant political economy implications 
for the decision of whether and when to open up.
14 
Be that as it may, the evidence in this paper demonstrates that trade in capital has 
significant consequences for the real economy beyond its impact on prices and quantities of 
capital.  All else equal, capital account liberalization raises the average standard of living for a 
significant fraction of the workforce in developing countries.  As the quality and breadth of data 
on labor markets in developing countries continues to improve, future work may produce yet 
more definitive conclusions. 
                                                 
14 See, for example, Rajan and Zingales (2003) and Chari and Gupta (2008). 
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 Panel A:  The Cost of Capital 
Figure 3.  Hypothetical Impact of Liberalization on the Cost of Capital, Investment and the Real Wage. 






Panel B:  Ratio of Capital to Effective Labor 







Panel C:  Real Wage 
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Table 1.  The Growth Rate of the Real Wage Rises Consistently Across Countries in the Aftermath of Liberalizations.  
Country    Liberalization  Year  0 1 2 Mean  Median  Standard Deviation  Data Coverage 
Argentina 1989  -68.5%  76.2%  N.A  -2.6%  -2.0%  32.6%  1984-2001 
             
Brazil  1988  N.A. N.A  N.A. 11.8%  14.9% 7.7%  1990-1995 
             
Chile  1987  1.2% 3.0% 4.0% 0.9% 4.0%  18.8%  1963-2000 
             
Colombia  1991  -1.9% 5.9%  11.1% -0.4% -2.0%  9.1%  1963-1999 
             
India  1986  6.5% 2.1% -1.4%  -1.4%  0.0%  7.7%  1963-2002 
             
Indonesia  1989  0.8% -29.9%  4.1% 5.9% 5.3%  16.6%  1970-2003 
             
Jordan    1995  6.5% 2.1% -1.4%  -0.2%  -0.3%  14.3%  1963-2003 
             
Malaysia  1987  0.8% -29.9%  4.1% 5.5% 8.4%  14.6%  1963-2002 
             
Mexico  1989  7.8% -2.4%  1.7% 1.8% 2.0%  5.5%  1968-2002 
             
Nigeria  1995  18.6% 26.0% 25.1% 1.5%  9.6%  19.3%  1984-2000 
             
Pakistan  1991  -2.8% -9.3% -4.1% 1.9%  2.4%  14.8%  1963-1996 
             
Philippines  1986  11.7% 8.7%  14.5% -0.1% 1.3%  12.7%  1963-1997 
             
South  Korea  1987  15.7%  7.3% N.A  1.2% 2.1%  10.9%  1963-1996 
             
Taiwan  1986  0.3%  10.4% 10.0% 5.9%  8.4%  24.0%  1967-1994 
             
Thailand  1987  -21.6%  N.A N.A 1.5%  3.7%  19.4%  1963-1997 
             
Turkey   1989  N.A.  N.A  14.7%  7.2%  6.4%  7.2%  1973-1997 
             
Venezuela  1990  27.0% 39.8% 25.8% -3.4% 1.2%  22.1%  1963-1998 
             
Zimbabwe  1993  13.1% 23.4% 16.3% -0.7% -0.1%  12.7%  1963-1996 
             
Number Negative  
(p-value) 






      
“Liberalization Year” is the year in which the country identified in column 1 opened its stock market to foreign investment as defined in Section 2A.  The column labeled “0” gives 
the growth rate of the real wage of the corresponding country in the year it liberalized.  The columns labeled “1” and “2” give the growth rate in the first and second year after 
liberalization.  For a given country, the mean, median and standard deviation statistics are computed over the entire sample for each country.  The column labeled “Data Coverage” 
gives the years for which we have data for each country.  “Number negative” is the number of countries in a given year (e.g., year “0”) for whom the growth rate of the real wage 
falls below its country-specific median.  The p-value in parenthesis gives the probability of finding no more than the given number of countries below their median growth rate under 
the assumption that the underlying distribution of real wage growth rates during liberalization years is no different than in non-liberalization years.   40 
Table 2.  Capital Account Liberalizations Occur Around the Same Time as Other Major Economic Reforms. 
Country   Capital Liberalization  Stabilization Program  Trade Liberalization  Privatization  Brady Plan Debt Relief  
Argentina  November 1989  November 1989  April 1991  February 1988  April 1992 
       
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
Brazil  March 1988  January 1989  April 1990  July 1990  August 1992 
     
Chile  May 1987  August 1985  1976  1988  NA 
     
Colombia December  1991  NA  1986  1991  NA 
     
India  June 1986  November 1981  1994  1991  NA 
     
Indonesia  September 1989  May 1973  1970  1991  NA 
     
Jordan   December 1995  May 1994  1965  January 1995  June 1993 
     
Malaysia May  1987  NA  1963  1988  NA 
     
Mexico  May 1989  May 1989  July 1986  November 1988  September 1989 
     
Nigeria  August 1995  January 1991  NA  July 1988  March 1991 
     
Pakistan  February 1991  September 1993  2001  1990  NA 
     
Philippines  May 1986  October 1986  November 1988 
   
June 1988  August 1989 
     
South Korea  June 1987  July 1985  1968  NA  NA 
     
Taiwan May  1986  NA  1963  NA  NA 
     
Thailand  September 1987  June 1985  Always Open 
   
1988  NA 
     
Turkey   August 1989  July 1994  1989  1988  NA 
     
Venezuela  January 1990  June 1989  May 1989** 
   
April 1991  June 1990 
     
Zimbabwe  June 1993  September 1992  NA  1994  NA 
Notes:  The capital account liberalization dates identified in this table are the dates on which the eighteen countries in Column 1 eased restrictions prohibiting foreign ownership of 
domestic stocks.    The liberalization dates in Column 2 are an amalgamation of those in Henry (2000) and Levine and Zervos (1998b).  Columns 3 through 6 list the dates of major 
economic reforms that occurred around the same time as the capital account liberalizations.  The stabilization program dates in Column 4 come from Henry (2002) and various 
issues of the IMF Annual Reports.  Column 5 lists trade liberalization dates from Sachs and Warner (1995).  The privatization dates in Column 6 come form the Privatization Data 
Base maintained by the World Bank.  Finally, Column 6 lists the month and year that each country received debt relief under the Brady Plan.  The debt relief dates come from 





Table 3.  Liberalization Temporarily Increases the Growth Rate of Real Wages and Productivity. 
  
Panel A: Real Wages 
  
Panel B: Productivity 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
              
CONSTANT  0.0119 0.01084  0.0138 0.0119 0.0127     0.0195**  0.0192**  0.0218***  0.0195**  0.0215*** 
  (0.0085) (0.00855)  (0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0085)     (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0078) (0.0079) (0.0078) 
                          
LIBERALIZE  0.0636***  0.0589** 0.0864***  0.0509*  0.0733**     0.0556** 0.0543** 0.0832***  0.0708*** 0.1009*** 
  (0.0242) (0.02429)  (0.0253) (0.0290) (0.0301)     (0.0221) (0.0223) (0.0230) (0.0265) (0.0274) 
                                  
CONTROL  -0.0153 -0.01979  -0.0112 -0.0182 -0.0177     -0.0099 -0.0111 -0.0049 -0.0063 -0.0021 
  (0.0157) (0.01592)  (0.0156) (0.0161) (0.0163)     (0.0144) (0.0147) (0.0143) (0.0148) (0.0149) 
                                  
TRADE     0.04789        0.0484        0.0131        0.0176 
     (0.03042)        (0.0303)        (0.0279)        (0.0275) 
                                  
STABILIZE        -0.088***     -0.088***           -0.107***     -0.109*** 
        (0.0314)     (0.0314)           (0.0285)     (0.0285) 
                                  
PRIVATIZE           0.0245  0.0165              -0.0295  -0.0364 
           (0.0310)  (0.0309)              (0.0283)  (0.0281) 
Number of 
Observations  502 502 502 502 502     502 502 502 502 502 
                                  
Adjusted R-
Squared  0.0165 0.0199 0.0348 0.0165 0.0385     0.0144 0.0146 0.0441 0.0174 0.0489 
The estimation procedure is ordinary least squares.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  The symbols (***), (**), and (*) represent significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively.  For the regressions reported in Panel A, the left-hand-side variable is the change in the natural log of the real wage.  For the regressions reported in Panel B, the left-
hand-side variable is the change in the natural log of value-added per worker.  LIBERALIZE is a dummy variable that takes on the value of one in the year that country i liberalizes 
(year [0]) and each of the subsequent two years ([1] and [2]).  CONTROL is a dummy variable that takes on the value one for all members of country i's control group during 
country i's liberalization episode.  TRADE, STABILIZE, and PRIVATIZE are dummy variables that take on the value one whenever a trade liberalization, inflation stabilization, or 





Table 4.  Liberalization Temporarily Increases the Growth Rate of Real Wages and Productivity (robust standard errors). 
  
Panel A: Real Wages 
  
Panel B: Productivity 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
                
CONSTANT  0.0119  0.01084  0.0138  0.0119  0.0127      0.0195*** 0.0192*** 0.0218*** 0.0195** 0.0215*** 
  (0.0080) (0.0081)  (0.0081)  (0.0080)  (0.0081)      (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0073) (0.0072)  (0.0073) 
                                  
LIBERALIZE  0.0636** 0.0589**  0.0864*** 0.0509*  0.0733**      0.0556**  0.0543**  0.0832*** 0.0708** 0.1009*** 
  (0.0288) (0.0282)  (0.0335)  (0.0276)  (0.0317)      (0.0263) (0.0266) (0.0308) (0.0291)  (0.0332) 
                                  
CONTROL  -0.0153  -0.01979  -0.0112 -0.0182 -0.0177     -0.0099 -0.0111 -0.0049 -0.0063  -0.0021 
  (0.0165) (0.0164)  (0.0158)  (0.0175)  (0.0167)      (0.0153) (0.0155) (0.0140) (0.0160)  (0.0147) 
                                  
TRADE     0.04789        0.0484        0.0131        0.0176 
     (0.0323)        (0.0302)        (0.0247)        (0.0231) 
                                  
STABILIZE        -0.0882**     -0.0883**           -0.1067***     -0.109*** 
        (0.0403)     (0.0404)           (0.0413)     (0.0415) 
                                  
PRIVATIZE           0.0245  0.0165              -0.0295  -0.0364 
           (0.0320)  (0.0318)              (0.0319)  (0.0318) 
Number of 
Observations  502  502 502 502 502     502 502 502 502  502 
                                  
Adjusted R-
Squared  0.0165  0.0199 0.0348 0.0165 0.0385     0.0144 0.0146 0.0441 0.0174  0.0489 
The estimation procedure is ordinary least squares.  Heteroscedastic-consistent (White) standard errors appear in parentheses.  The symbols (***), (**), and (*) represent 
significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  For the regressions reported in Panel A, the left-hand-side variable is the change in the natural log of the real wage.  For the 
regressions reported in Panel B, the left-hand-side variable is the change in the natural log of value-added per worker.  LIBERALIZE is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 
one in the year that country i liberalizes (year [0]) and each of the subsequent two years ([1] and [2]).  CONTROL is a dummy variable that takes on the value one for all members 
of country i's control group during country i's liberalization episode.  TRADE, STABILIZE, and PRIVATIZE are dummy variables that take on the value one whenever a trade 
liberalization, inflation stabilization, or privatization program takes place during country i’s capital account liberalization episode.  All specifications contain seventeen country-





Table 5.  Liberalization Temporarily Increases the Growth Rate of Real Wages and Productivity (standard errors robust and clustered by year). 
  
Panel A: Real Wages 
  
Panel B: Productivity 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
                      
CONSTANT  0.0119  0.01084  0.0138 0.0119 0.0127     0.0195*  0.0192 0.0218*  0.0195  0.0215* 
  (0.0116) (0.0114)  (0.0114)  (0.0116)  (0.0113)     (0.0116)  (0.0117)  (0.0115)  (0.0116)  (0.0116) 
                                  
LIBERALIZE  0.0636***  0.0589***  0.0864***  0.0509** 0.0733**     0.0556** 0.0543** 0.0832***  0.0708**  0.1009*** 
  (0.0202) (0.0189)  (0.0239)  (0.0221)  (0.0223)     (0.0253)  (0.0251)  (0.0285)  (0.0308)  (0.0314) 
                                  
CONTROL  -0.0153  -0.01979  -0.0112 -0.0182 -0.0177     -0.0099 -0.0111 -0.0049 -0.0063  -0.0021 
  (0.0144) (0.0146)  (0.0145)  (0.0163)  (0.0163)     (0.0195)  (0.0196)  (0.0193)  (0.0206)  (0.0200) 
                                  
TRADE     0.0479*        0.0484*        0.0131        0.0176 
     (0.0266)        (0.0278)        (0.0225)        (0.0228) 
                                  
STABILIZE        -0.0882**     -0.0883**           -0.107***     -0.109*** 
        (0.0420)     (0.0419)           (0.0362)     (0.0369) 
                                  
PRIVATIZE           0.0245  0.0165              -0.0295  -0.0364 
           (0.0374)  (0.0384)              (0.0315)  (0.0317) 
Number of 
Observations  502  502 502 502 502     502 502 502 502  502 
                                  
Adjusted R-
Squared  0.0165  0.0199 0.0348 0.0165 0.0385     0.0144 0.0146 0.0441 0.0174  0.0489 
The estimation procedure is ordinary least squares.  Heteroscedastic-consistent (White) standard errors appear in parentheses.  All specifications also cluster the standard errors by 
year to account for the possibility that shocks to wage growth are correlated across countries within a given year.  The symbols (***), (**), and (*) represent significance levels of 
1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  For the regressions reported in Panel A, the left-hand-side variable is the change in the natural log of the real wage.  For the regressions reported 
in Panel B, the left-hand-side variable is the change in the natural log of value-added per worker.  LIBERALIZE is a dummy variable that takes on the value of one in the year that 
country i liberalizes (year [0]) and each of the subsequent two years ([1] and [2]).  CONTROL is a dummy variable that takes on the value one for all members of country i's control 
group during country i's liberalization episode.  TRADE, STABILIZE, and PRIVATIZE are dummy variables that take on the value one whenever a trade liberalization, inflation 





Table 6.  Liberalization Temporarily Increases the Growth Rate of Real Wages and Productivity (standard errors robust and clustered by country). 
  
Panel A: Real Wages 
  
Panel B: Productivity 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)   (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
                
CONSTANT  0.0116  0.0107 0.0137 0.0116 0.0127   0.0190 ***  0.0188 ***  0.0214 ***  0.019 ***  0.0210 *** 
  (0.0081)  (0.0081) (0.0078) (0.0081) (0.0077)   (0.0058) (0.0055) (0.0060) (0.0057)  (0.0057) 
                
LIBERALIZE  0.063** 0.060**  0.088**  0.058*  0.082*    0.056** 0.055** 0.084** 0.073**  0.104** 
  (0.0290)  (0.0266) (0.0405) (0.0274) (0.0457)   (0.0241) (0.0242) (0.0373) (0.0293)  (0.0419) 
                
CONTROL  -0.0141  -0.0179 -0.0099 -0.0155 -0.0143   -0.0080 -0.0090 -0.0031 -0.0038  0.0003 
  (0.0189)  (0.0174) (0.0190) (0.0207) (0.0201)   (0.0144) (0.0146) (0.0127) (0.0146)  (0.0136) 
                
TRADE      0.0397    0.0432       0.0099      0.0171 
      (0.0376)    (0.0321)       (0.0253)      (0.0179) 
                
STABILIZE        -0.094*     -0.096*         -0.108*     -0.111* 
        (0.0514)     (0.0523)         (0.0583)     (0.0594) 
                
PRIVATIZE          0.0110  0.0038             -0.0345  -0.0404 
          (0.0326)  (0.0333)             (0.0300)  (0.0307) 
Number of 
Observations  502  502 502 502 502 
 
495 495 495 495  495 
                                 
Adjusted R-
Squared  0.0165  0.0200 0.0348 0.0168 0.0293 
 
0.0104 0.0147 0.0383 0.0175  0.0392 
The estimation procedure is ordinary least squares.  Heteroscedastic-consistent (White) standard errors appear in parentheses.  All specifications also cluster the standard errors by 
country to account for the possibility that the shocks to wage growth are correlated over time within a given country.  The symbols (***), (**), and (*) represent significance levels 
of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  For the regressions reported in Panel A, the left-hand-side variable is the change in the natural log of the real wage.  For the regressions 
reported in Panel B, the left-hand-side variable is the change in the natural log of value-added per worker.  LIBERALIZE is a dummy variable that takes on the value of one in the 
year that country i liberalizes (year [0]) and each of the subsequent two years ([1] and [2]).  CONTROL is a dummy variable that takes on the value one for all members of country 
i's control group during country i's liberalization episode.  TRADE, STABILIZE, and PRIVATIZE are dummy variables that take on the value one whenever a trade liberalization, 




Countries that never liberalized as of 1997: Algeria, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Congo, Costa Rica, Cote D'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Jamaica, Kenya, Kuwait, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Nepal, 
Nicaragua, Niger, Oman, Paraguay, Peru, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Tunisia, Uruguay, Zambia. 
Countries that liberalized before 1980: Australia, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway. 
Countries that liberalized between 1980 and 1997: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Greece, India, Indonesia, Israel, 
Jordan, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Thailand, 
Turkey, Venezuela, Zimbabwe. 
 
Countries in the Control Group for a Given Liberalization Year  
Liberalization Year  Control Countries 
  
1986  Argentina, Colombia, Indonesia, Jordan, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Turkey, Venezuela, 
Zimbabwe. 
  
1987  Colombia, Jordan, Nigeria, Pakistan, Zimbabwe, Venezuela. 
  
1988  Colombia, Jordan, Nigeria, Pakistan, Zimbabwe 
  
1989  India, Jordan, Nigeria, Philippines, Taiwan, Zimbabwe 
  
1990  Chile, India, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Nigeria, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Zimbabwe 
  
1991  Brazil, Chile, India, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Nigeria, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand 
  
1993  Argentina, Brazil, Chile, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Taiwan, 
Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela 
  
1995  Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela 
 